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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is Khalid Khawar, who undertook no voluntary act to 
influence the resolution of a public controversy, a private 
figure?
2. Does The Globe’s failure to investigate obvious and 
available sources, its reputation for sensationalism, and 
the inherent improbability of the story constitute reckless 
disregard for the truth or falsity of the article published?
3. Should the California Supreme Court reject adopting a 
"neutral reportage privilege," because neither the 
California legislature nor the United States Supreme Court 
have recognized such a privilege?
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S054868
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID IQBAL KHAWAR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant and Petitioner.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding Khalid Khawar 
(Mr. Khawar) compensatory and punitive damages against The Globe 
Int'l, Inc. (The Globe) for defamation. (C.T. 2780-83, 2790-91.) 
Mr. Khawar filed suit against The Globe in March, 1990, after the 
tabloid republished accusations that he assassinated Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy. (C.T. 137, 139.)
In March, 1994, a jury found that Mr. Khawar was a private 
figure. (C.T. 2782.) It also found that The Globe (1) had 
printed false and defamatory statements about Mr. Khawar; (2) was 
negligent in failing to learn whether the statements it printed 
were false before publishing them; (3) published its article with 
reckless disregard as to whether the defamatory material was true 
or false; (4) published its article with malice or oppression
1
toward Mr. Khawar; and (5) published a neutral and accurate 
report of the book upon which its article was based. (C.T. 2781- 
83.) The jury awarded Mr. Khawar $675,000 in compensatory 
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. (C.T. 2783, 2791.)
The trial court entered judgment on April 20, 1994. (C.T. 3116.)
In June, 1994, The Globe filed a timely appeal to the 
California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District.
(C.T. 3130.) The appellate court upheld the lower court's 
verdict. Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 
(1996), review granted, September 25, 1996 {S046116). The Globe 
appealed to this Court. (C.T, X.)
Statement of Facts
In 1968, Mr. Khawar covered the presidential election as a 
free-lance photojournalist for a Pakistani periodical. (R.T. 
1336-37.) On June 4, 1968, Mr. Khawar was at the Ambassador 
Hotel in Los Angeles, California, to cover a speech given by 
Robert Kennedy. (R.T. 1338.) Because Mr. Khawar was on the 
podium with Kennedy, he appeared in photographs taken of Kennedy 
just prior to Kennedy's assassination. (R.T. 1339-40) Mr.
Khawar is now a farmer in Bakersfield, California. (R.T. 1355.)
The photographs of Mr. Khawar standing near Kennedy appeared 
in a book by Robert Morrow, titled: "The Senator Must Die: The 
Murder of Robert F. Kennedy." (C.T. 156.) The caption 
identified Mr. Khawar as "Ali Ahmand." (C.T. 156.) Mr. Khawar, 
referred to as Ali Ahmand, was identified as the "actual
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assassin" of Senator Kennedy. (C.T. 150.) Morrow is a convicted 
felon. (R.T. 850.) Another author who has written about 
assassination conspiracy theories and who has met Morrow said 
Morrow "wasn't playing with a full deck." (R.T. 2151.)
One photograph from Morrow's book was printed in the April, 
1989, issue of The Globe with an article accusing Mr. Khawar of 
being a member of the mafia and killing Robert Kennedy. (C.T. 
3145.) The Globe had superimposed a large arrow on the 
photograph pointing at Mr. Khawar. (R.T. 1357-58.) The Globe 
did not contact the police detective who headed the Kennedy 
assassination investigation or the head of the state archives to 
learn whether Mr. Khawar could have been Kennedy's true assassin. 
(R.T. 702, 708, 957.)
The Globe article prompted calls to Mr, Khawar from all over 
the world inquiring as to the accuracy of the article. (R.T.
1364, 1366.) The Khawar family also began receiving anonymous 
threatening calls. (R.T. 1366-67.) As a result of the 
publication, Mr. Khawar’s farmhouse was "egged," and his son's 
car was vandalized twice. (R.T. 1367, 1379.) The anonymous 
threats continued throughout the trial. (R.T. 1367-68.) This 
caused Mr. Khawar to fear for the safety of his wife and 
children, as well as for his own safety. (R.T. 1360-61.)
Mr. Khawar contacted the Bakersfield police three times.
(R.T. 1379.) A friend who had previously been with the
Bakersfield Police Department advised Mr. Khawar to consult with
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a lawyer. (R.T. 1366-67.) After filing suit to clear his name, 
Mr. Khawar was contacted by a newspaper and a local television 
station asking him for interviews. (R.T, 1368.) Mr. Khawar 
declined the interview with the newspaper, but he later gave one 
interview to the television station as part of a report on the 
story. (R.T, 1369.) In addition to the threats, Mr. Khawar, at 
least through the trial, continued to have nightmares and to lose 
sleep. (R.T. 1369.)
The trial judge ruled as a matter of law that The Globe 
article was not a neutral and accurate report, overturning the 
jury's finding on the issue. (R.T. 2740.) The article included 
no response from Mr. Khawar. (R.T. 797 .) This lack of balance 
is indicative of a standard of reporting by The Globe which is 
below acceptable levels of professional care. (R.T. 797-98.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court correctly found that Mr. Khawar was a 
private figure, because the nature and extent of Mr. Khawar's 
participation in the controversy did not make him a limited 
purpose public figure. Mr. Khawar is not a voluntary limited 
purpose public figure because he took no voluntary actions to 
influence the outcome of a controversy.
Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited purpose public 
figure because neither the United States Supreme Court nor this 
Court have firmly embraced this category of public figure.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have focused
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solely on the voluntary acts of the plaintiff, indicating that 
the Court does not wish to develop the involuntary public figure 
category. Similarly, this Court has never adopted this category 
of public figure. This Court looks for evidence of affirmative 
actions by which purported ’public figures* have thrust 
themselves into the forefront of particular public controversies.
Even if this Court adopts the involuntary limited purpose 
public figure category, Mr. Khawar does not meet the requirements 
of any tests set forth by other courts. Applying the facts of 
this case to tests created by various federal Courts of Appeal, 
Mr. Khawar is a private figure. Thus, this Court should find 
that Mr. Khawar is a private figure.
Independent review of all the evidence supports the lower 
court’s finding that The Globe acted with actual malice. Actual 
malice may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The Globe’s 
failure to check an obvious and available source, the 
publication's reputation for sensationalism, the inherent 
improbability of the story, and the lack of necessity for rapid 
dissemination of the information are all circumstantial evidence 
of The Globe’s reckless disregard for the falsity of its 
allegations. Therefore, this Court should find that The Globe 
acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory article.
This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege.
It is an unnecessary extension of media protection that the 
United States Supreme Court has not recognized. Although
5
promoting the free discussion of controversial events is a worthy 
goal, current defamation law offers the media adequate protection 
from defamation suits. Even if this Court decided to adopt the 
privilege, the privilege would not exonerate The Globe. The 
tabloid's article did not meet the requirements of the neutral 
reportage privilege.
ARGUMENT
I. KHALID KHAWAR IS A PRIVATE FIGURE UNDER TESTS SET FORTH BY
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT.
The trial court's determination of whether an individual is 
a public or private figure is a mixed question of law and fact. 
See Stolz V. KSFM 102 FM, 30 Cal. App. 4th 195, 204 (1994), cert, 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 79 (1995). The standard of review for an 
appellate court is whether, after reviewing the entire record, 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision. Id.
A. Mr, Khawar is not a voluntary limited purpose public
figure because he took no voluntary actions to
influence the outcome of a controversy.
The United States Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), stated that in considering whether an 
individual is a limited purpose public figure^, a court should 
look to "the nature and extent of an individual's participation 
in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."
' "Some (individuals] occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes."
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979)
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). Mr. Khawar has not attained that
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. A person should not be considered a 
public figure solely because that person happens to be involved 
in a controversy that is newsworthy; rather, to be considered a 
public figure, an individual must have undertaken some voluntary 
act through which he seeks to influence the resolution of the 
public issues involved. See Reader*s Digest Ass*n, Inc, v. 
Superior Court (Synanon Church), 37 Cal. 3d 244, 254 (1984), 
cert, denied sub nom,, Synanon Church v. Reader's Digest Ass*n, 
478 U.S. 1009 (1986) (citing Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976) and Wolston v. Reader*s Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 
157 (1979)).
There is no evidence that Mr. Khawar undertook any voluntary 
act to influence the resolution of the issues involved in a 
controversy. While Mr. Khawar voluntarily arranged to be at the 
Ambassador Hotel and on the podium that evening, he was not 
"seeking to influence the resolution of a controversy." Mr. 
Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel to cover the election as a 
photojournalist for a Pakistani publication, because he admired 
Robert Kennedy and hoped to have his picture taken with him.
(R.T. 1340.) Mr. Khawar undertook these voluntary actions 
without regard to any controversy. Subsequently, these actions 
do not render him a voluntary limited purpose public figure. See 
Reader*s Digest Ass*n, 37 Cal. 3d at 254.
kind of status, and consequently is not a general purpose public
figure.
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Mr. Khawar is also not a voluntary public figure, because 
when these voluntary actions occurred, Kennedy had not yet been 
assassinated, so there was no controversy to influence. Because 
Gertz requires an individual to inject himself into or to be 
drawn into a particular public controversy, the Court presumed a 
controversy existed before the individual was involved. Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 351. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill (1979), 
the Court directly addressed this issue. There, the Court stated 
that defendants cannot "create their own defense” by bringing 
previously unknown individuals into the public eye. Hutchinson, 
443 U.S. at 135. Mr. Khawar*s "voluntary actions” are 
insufficient to confer public figure status upon him. Id.
The one voluntary action that Mr. Khawar took after the 
assassination was to defend himself against The Globe's attack by 
granting an interview with a local television station. (R.T. 
1369.) According to the United States Supreme Court, holding 
repeated press conferences with the media does not, in and of 
itself, establish public figure status. Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 455 n.3 (1976). In Firestone, Russel Firestone, 
the heir to the "Firestone Tire" fortune, was involved in divorce 
proceedings. at 450-51. Mrs. Firestone's marriage and her
social standing in the community afforded her the access to the 
media to hold several press conferences during the trial. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450-51. Yet, the Court found her to be a 
private figure. Id. at 455 n.3.
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Mr. Khawar is not a socialite; he is a farmer. (R.T. 1355.)
Mr. Khawar gave only one interview to the press, and this was 
only to respond to the allegations made by The Globe. {R.T. 
1369.) Mr, Khawar undertook no voluntary action to influence the 
outcome of a public controversy; consequently, this Court should 
find that Mr. Khawar is not a voluntary public figure.
B. Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited purpose public
figure because, even if this category of public figure
does exist, he does not meet any of the requirements.
1. Recent case law suggests that the United States 
Supreme Court no longer recognizes this category
of public figure.
In Gertz, the Court, in a single sentence of dictum, stated 
that, ”[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become 
a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the 
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly 
rare." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. However, the Court then 
suggested that voluntary actions were the touchstone of the 
public/private analysis. Id. The Court stated that, because 
private individuals have not voluntarily exposed themselves to 
the increased risk of defamation that public figures have, they 
have "a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury 
inflicted by defamatory falsehood." Id.
The Court has followed the "voluntary" requirement of this 
latter statement fairly closely. In the twenty three years since 
Gertz, the United States Supreme Court has never found an 
individual to be an involuntary public figure. The Court has
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cited the Gertz decision in 71 subsequent cases. In none of
those 71 cases did the Court discuss involuntary public figures.
In the one case where the Court quoted the "being drawn into 
a public controversy" language of Gertz, the language appeared in 
a footnote as part of the entire Gertz quote on public figures. 
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 n.3 (1986) 
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.); see also Lorain Journal Co. v. 
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 961 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After Gertz, when presented with opportunities to embrace 
the Gertz dictum, the Court instead inquired only into the 
voluntary actions of the plaintiff. In Firestone, the Court 
addressed the public/private issue by challenging the utility of 
the "drawn into" language mentioned in Gertz. Firestone, 424 
U.S. at 457. The Court stated that while participants in some 
litigation may be legitimate public figures, the majority will 
more likely be "drawn into a public forum largely against their 
will." Id. The Court went on to say that there was little 
reason why these individuals should forfeit the protection which 
the law would otherwise afford them "simply by virtue of their 
being drawn into a courtroom.” Id.
If the Court had wished to recognize an "involuntary public 
figure" category, it could easily have done so in Firestone.
One year earlier the Seventh Circuit had discussed, in dicta in 
Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976), the idea 
that the wife of a famous entertainer "more or less automatically
10
Carson, 529becomes at least a part-time public figure herself."
F.2d at 210; see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (finding children of 
Julius and Ethyl Rosenberg to be public figures). Had the United 
States Supreme Court felt that such a category did exist for 
family members of public figures, it could have applied it in 
Firestone. Instead, the Court took the opportunity to move 
further away from the hypothetical involuntary language of the 
Gertz decision.
Three years later the Court again refused to extend public 
figure status to individuals who had taken no voluntary actions. 
See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135. Ronald Hutchinson, director of 
research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, sued Senator 
William Proxmire after Proxmire, in a press release, criticized 
Hutchinson's research as "transparent worthlessness" and 
intimated that Hutchinson made a fortune at taxpayers' expense.
Id. at 114, 116. The Court held that Hutchinson was not a public 
figure. Id. at 135 (considering Hutchinson's voluntary actions, 
access to the media, and whether he had assumed a role of special 
prominence). The Court found that Hutchinson did not voluntarily 
thrust himself to the forefront of a controversy. See id. 
Hutchinson's actions became the subject of public controversy 
only as a result of Proxmire's actions in attacking Hutchinson's 
research and questioning his motives. Id. Similarly, Mr. Khawar 
became the subject of a controversy only after The Globe named
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him as an assassin. Few knew who Khalid Khawar was until The
Globe published its article.
The Court also found Hutchinson had insufficient access to 
the media to adequately address the remarks made by Senator 
Proxmire. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136. Hutchinson did not have 
the "regular and continuing access to the media that is one of 
the accouterments of having become a public figure.” Id. 
Similarly, Mr. Khawar had no access to the media other than to 
respond to the allegations made by The Globe. He possessed only 
the "regular and continuing" access to the media that any potato 
farmer does, and The Globe should not be allowed to profit from 
that fact. See id.
Lastly, the Court addressed the fact that Hutchinson had not 
assumed a role of special prominence with regard to the specific 
subject of the controversy. Id. at 135-36. Here, Mr. Khawar has 
clearly not assumed any role of special prominence.
The Court could have found that Hutchinson was an 
involuntary public figure. Hutchinson clearly qualifies for 
"being drawn” into a public controversy. The public controversy 
was the use and misuse of the public's taxes. Id. at 114-16,
The Court chose not to consider this controversy as sufficient to 
render Hutchinson a public figure, id. at 135.
In its analysis, the Court cited the definition of a public 
figure as set forth in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, but excluded any 
mention of involuntary public figures. Id. at 134. The Court
12
I
cited verbatim, the "hypothetical involuntary figure" paragraph 
of Gertz, but conspicuously left out the first two lines dealing 
with involuntary public figures. Hutchinson. 443 U.S. at 134. 
This reinforces the notion that the Court is increasingly 
unwilling to confer public figure status on those who have done 
nothing to warrant it.
In a later holding that further conflicted with the Gertz 
dictum, the Court stated that although an individual's failure to 
appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet espionage was 
newsworthy, "[a] private individual is not automatically 
transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or 
associated with a matter that attracts public attention."
Wolston, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). Wolston's refusal to appear 
before a grand jury investigating espionage led to media scrutiny 
and numerous subsequent articles about him. ^ at 162. By 
contrast, there was no such refusal here; Mr. Khawar cooperated 
with police in their investigation. (R.t. 1351.) Nonetheless, 
as the Wolston decision indicates, Mr. Khawar cannot be 
transformed into a public figure simply by virtue of being 
associated with this issue. In light of these recent decisions, 
there are serious doubts as to whether lower courts should 
continue to afford the Gertz dictum any significance whatsoever.
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2. The California Supreme Court has never adopted 
this category of public figure.
While the California Supreme Court has discussed the 
possibility of the existence of this kind of public figure, as 
every court quoting Gertz has, tests set forth by this Court 
since Gertz do not appear to recognize the category. See Vegod 
Coro. V. ABC, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769 (1979), cert, denied, 449 
U.S. 886 (1980); s^ also Reader^s Digest Ass'n, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 
at 254.
In Vegod, this Court focused on the lack of voluntary 
actions by the plaintiffs. See Vegod, 25 Cal. 3d at 769. This 
Court stated that the plaintiffs "[could not] be said to have 
thrown themselves into the vortex of that controversy. . . . 
Merely doing business with parties to a public controversy does 
not elevate one to public figure status." Id.
This Court addressed the issue again in Reader's Digest 
Ass'n. There, this Court was faced with the public figure 
determination with regard to the Synanon Church and its founder, 
Charles Dederich. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 37 Cal. 3d at 252.
This Court stated that "courts should look for evidence of 
affirmative actions by which purported 'public figures* have 
thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public 
controversies." Id. 254-55 (emphasis added). In making the 
determination that they were public figures, this Court examined 
plaintiffs "myriad attempts to thrust their case and Synanon in
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general into the public eye." Reader’s Digest Ass'n, 37 Cal. 3d 
at 255. This Court noted that "Synanon engaged in extensive 
publicity campaigns in which it sought and achieved a favorable 
reputation as an organization for the rehabilitation of drug 
addicts.” Id. at 255.
Here, there are no such affirmative actions by which Mr. 
Khawar thrust himself to the forefront of a particular public 
controversy. Under this Court's holding in Reader's Digest 
Ass'n, Mr. Khawar cannot be a public figure. See supra Part I.A.
Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court has never 
found any individual to be an involuntary public figure. While 
this is not dispositive, it does indicate this Court's continuing 
reluctance to categorize individuals like Mr. Khawar, who have 
taken no voluntary actions, as limited purpose public figures. 
Because this Court has not adopted the category of involuntary 
limited purpose public figure in the past, and because it would 
be inapplicable in this case, this Court should not apply it now.
3. Even if the California Supreme Court now chooses
to adopt this category, Mr. Khawar does not fit
within it under any of the tests adopted by other
courts.
Various federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted tests 
to determine limited purpose public figure status, although only 
one has done so based upon the Gertz dicta. In Dameron v. 
Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986), the Court of Appeals modified the
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three-part test it had established in Waldbaum v. Fairchild 
Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 
449 U.S. 898 (1980), to determine whether Mr. Dameron was a 
limited purpose public figure. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741. Under 
this modified test the court had to determine (1) whether there 
was a public controversy, (2) whether the plaintiff played a 
sufficiently central role in that controversy, and (3) whether 
the defamatory remarks were relevant to the plaintiff's 
involvement in the controversy. Id.
Applying the facts of the case at bar to the test in Dameron 
shows Mr. Khawar to be a private figure. Even assuming a public 
controversy existed when the article was published, Mr, Khawar 
did not play a central role in that controversy. Further, while 
The Globe's article was relevant to Mr. Khawar's involvement in 
the controversy, it was relevant only to the extent that it 
created his role in that controversy. Even if this Court were to 
apply the Dameron concept of being drawn into a controversy by 
"bad luck,** the factors of the Dameron test preclude a finding of 
public figure status.
The Dameron Court inappropriately ascribed too much 
significance to the Gertz dictum and has opened the door for the 
media to attack those who would otherwise remain private 
individuals. The holding in Dameron was wrong, is contrary to 
recent United States Supreme Court holdings, and should not be 
followed by this Court.
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In Leman v. Flynt Distrib. Co.; Inc., 745 F.2d 123 (2ci Cir.
1984) , cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985), the Court of Appeals
held that to establish an individual is a limited purpose public
figure, a defendant must show the plaintiff:
"(1) successfully invited public attention to his views in 
an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is 
the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself 
into a public controversy related to the subject of the 
litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence in the 
public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and 
continuing access to the media.”
Leman, 745 F.2d at 136-37.
Applying this test to the facts of the case at bar clearly 
indicates that Mr. Khawar is a private figure. He did not 
successfully invite public attention to his views, nor did he 
voluntarily inject himself into any controversy. He assumed no 
position of prominence in the controversy, and he certainly had 
no "regular and continuing access" to the media. Thus, under 
this test Mr. Khawar is a private figure.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
proposed a two-part test for determining whether a defamation 
plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure, Marcone v. 
Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1082 {3d Cir.
1985) , cert, denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985). There, the court 
stated that the Gertz decision called for consideration of (1) 
whether the subject of the defamatory statement is a public 
controversy, and if so, (2) the "nature and extent" of the
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plaintiff’s involvement in the controversy. See Marcone, 754 
F.2ci at 1082.
Again, applying this test to the facts of the case at bar 
shows that Mr. Khawar is a private figure. As discussed earlier, 
the United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant 
cannot create a controversy by making defamatory remarks, and 
then claim a privilege based upon it being a public controversy. 
See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135, Even assuming that a public 
controversy existed prior to the publication, the second prong of 
the test is not met. Even a cursory examination of the nature 
and extent of Mr. Khawar's involvement will show that he played 
virtually no part in the controversy. Mr. Khawar was a 
bystander. He took no active part in either the assassination or 
the investigation that followed. The extent of Mr. Khawar's 
involvement was simply that he was present, by sheer bad luck, at 
the assassination. Even under the Dameron test, sheer bad luck 
alone is not enough to establish public figure status.
Finally, in a recent case, Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1553 (4th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals 
formulated a five-part test for distinguishing public/private 
figures. Under this test, a court must determine whether (1) the 
plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; (2) 
the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in 
the public controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the 
resolution or outcome of the controversy; (4) the controversy
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existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement; and 
(5) the plaintiff retained public-figure status at the time of 
the alleged defamation. See Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1553.
When applying the facts of the case at bar to this test, Mr. 
Khawar is clearly not a public figure. Mr. Khawar did not have 
effective access to the media. He had not voluntarily assumed 
any role of special prominence. He did not seek to influence the 
outcome of a controversy. No controversy existed prior to the 
publication by The Globe of the defamatory remarks. Finally, Mr. 
Khawar was not a public figure at the time of the defamation, nor 
is he at this time.
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that Mr. Khawar was a private figure. The United States 
Supreme Court, and all but one of the Circuit Courts^, have never 
found any individual to be an involuntary public figure. Given 
these facts, coupled with the absence of voluntary actions by Mr. 
Khawar, this Court should find Khalid Khawar to be a private 
figure.
II. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE GLOBE ACTED WITH ACTUAL MALICE
IN PUBLISHING THE ARTICLE.
The actual malice determination in a defamation suit 
requires de novo review; it is not necessary for an appellate
’ See Dameron, 779 F.2d 736. While the Second and Seventh 
Circuits have discussed the possibility of family members of public 
figures becoming public figures, both did so in the context of 
"general purpose public figures," rather than involuntary limited 
purpose public figures. See Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1066; see also 
Carson, 529 F.2d at 210 (dictum).
19
court to review the "entire" record; rather, only those portions 
of the record that relate to the actual malice determination must 
be independently assessed. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984), reh'g denied, 
467 U.S. 1267 (1967); see also McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 
835, 839 (1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). In 
performing the review, however, "due regard" must be given to the 
trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 500.
Liability under the New York Times "actual malice" standard 
requires a plaintiff to prove that the statement was made with 
knowledge of falsehood, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 279-80 (1964). 
To prove reckless disregard in a defamation case, there must be 
either (1) sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication, or (2) obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the 
informant or the accuracy of his reports. See St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S, 727, 731-32 (1968). "Publishing with such 
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice,” Id. at 731.
A plaintiff may prove actual malice by use of circumstantial 
evidence. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton, 
491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989). Here, there is substantial 
circumstantial evidence to justify a finding of actual malice.
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In Harte-Hanks, the Court stated that failure to check an
obvious and available source can be viewed as evidence of actual 
malice. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692-93. Here, Blackburn, the 
author of The Globe's article, never contacted any law 
enforcement agency that investigated the assassination to inquire 
about the validity of the accusations. (R.T. 957.) Blackburn is 
not even certain that he interviewed Mr. Morrow, the author of 
the book. (R.T. 1098.) Blackburn never called the Los Angeles 
Police Department to ask if a man named Ahmand, Iqbal or Khawar 
could have killed Kennedy. (R.T. 957.) He did not call the 
California State Archives, from whom he could have obtained all 
video and photographs taken that evening on one composite video 
tape. (R.T. 710.)
While Blackburn states he "believes he checked with LA 
directory assistance" about Ali Ahmand, he did not ask for 
information regarding Khalid Khawar. (R.T. 1121-22.)
Blackburn’s statement that he did not know who Khalid Khawar was, 
(R.T. 1122), is indicative of the lack of research done and of 
Blackburn’s credibility as a witness, since he claims to have 
read Mr. Morrow’s book "from cover to cover." (R.T. 1101.) In 
Morrow’s book Ahmand and Khawar were stated to be the same 
individual. (R.T. 705.) As stated, Blackburn investigated none 
of Morrow's sources, nor any of the agencies or individuals that 
might have provided evidence that the story was false. These 
were obvious and available sources that no representative of The
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Globe made any effort to contact. This evidence of purposeful
avoidance of the truth is sufficient to satisfy the New York 
Times standard. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692-93.
St. Amant, the Court stated that inherent improbability 
in a particular story is evidence of reckless disregard for truth 
or falsity. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. Here, there had been an 
extensive investigation, including police interviews with Mr. 
Khawar and everyone else present at the Ambassador Hotel that 
evening. (R.T. 1351.) Sirhan Sirhan had already been arrested, 
tried and convicted when Blackburn wrote the article, and 
Blackburn knew of this. (R.T. 1143.) Twenty years had passed 
and, until Morrow's book, there had been no mention of Mr. Khawar 
being involved in the assassination. Given these facts, the 
likelihood that this story was true was inherently improbable. 
These facts indicate reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
Courts have also considered the publication's reputation for 
sensationalism as evidence of actual malice. In Curtis Publ'g 
Co. V. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in addressing the actual malice 
requirement, cited "sophisticated muckraking designed to provoke 
people, make them mad" as indicative of actual malice. Curtis, 
388 U.S. at 169. In that case, in the early days of tabloid 
journalism, the Saturday Evening Post had embarked upon a 
campaign to increase magazine sales by making deceiving and 
outrageous claims, id. Here, the same factors are at work. The
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Globe seized upon the writings of a convicted felon^, (R.T.
850.)f to sell magazines, edited them to make them more 
titillating, (R.T. 829, 858.), and now seeks to invoke the First 
Amendment as a shield against civil prosecution.
Whether or not the issue involved was "hot news" is another 
factor the Curtis Court discussed as relevant to the question of 
reckless disregard for the truth. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 157-59, 
There, the Court considered the "necessity for rapid 
dissemination" of the information in the article as probative of 
whether it acted with reckless disregard by publishing without 
investigating. Id. at 158-59. There, the Court held that the 
story was "in no sense hot news.” Id. at 157. Similarly, the 
assassination of Robert Kennedy had occurred more than twenty 
years earlier, and there had already been a criminal trial and 
conviction. This was not "hot news."
In St. Amant, the Court stated that reckless disregard could 
not be fully encompassed in "one infallible definition," and that 
its outer limits would inevitably be determined by case-by-case 
adjudication. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731. In the future, this 
Court may be faced with a case that pushes those outer limits. 
However, this case requires no such redefinition of the 
boundaries. There is clear and convincing evidence that The
^ Additionally, recklessness may be found where there are obvious 
reasons to doubt the veracity of one's sources. See St. Amant, 390 
U.S. at 732. Blackburn read Morrow's book "cover to cover." (R.T. 
1101.) The book states that Morrow was a convicted felon. (R.T.
850) .
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Globe acted with reckless disregard in its publication of these 
damaging remarks. The right result was reached by the trial and 
appellate courts, and this Court should affirm their holdings.
III. CALIFORNIA SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE JUDGE-MADE "NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE."
Whether or not California courts should adopt the neutral 
reportage privilege is a question of law which is reviewed de 
novo. See Rosenbaum v. Security Pac. Corp., 43 Cal. App. 4th 
1084, 1089 (1996), review denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 3709 (Cal. June 
26, 1996} (noting that whether to expand common law 
landlord/tenant duty first created in another jurisdiction is a 
question of law the court reviews de novo).
A. The neutral reportage privilege is based loosely on
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
but is an unnecessary extension of freedom of speech
law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
created the neutral reportage privilege, which offers the media 
more protection in defamation suits than they enjoyed under 
common law. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'v> Inc., 556 
F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). The 
Second Circuit held that the media are protected in defamation 
suits even when they print possibly false statements, so long as 
they report the charges fairly and accurately. I^ at 120. 
Adopting the privilege is inappropriate, because the privilege is 
not consistent with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
See Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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The neutral reportage privilege created by Edwards protects
journalists who reprint defamatory charges against public 
figures, even if reporters doubt the truth of the statements/ 
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. In Edwards, the New York Times 
reprinted accusations first made by the National Audubon Society 
in its publication American Birds. Id. at 118. The Times 
article reprinted accusations that scientists who use bird count 
statistics to downplay the effects of the insecticide DDT are 
"paid to lie." See id. The Second Circuit held that the First 
Amendment protects these defamatory statements as a "fair and 
dispassionate reporting of an unfortunate but newsworthy 
contretemps." Id. at 120.
Under Edwards, there are four factors a news report must 
meet in order to qualify for the neutral reportage privilege: 
first, the report must be about a public figure; second, the 
statements in the report must be newsworthy; third, the charges 
in the report must be reported "fairly and accurately;" and 
fourth, the charges in the report must come from a responsible 
source. Id. at 120, 122.
The First T^endment should protect the media because of the 
value of informing the public about controversial issues. Id. at 
120. However, the neutral reportage privilege extends media
^ Under common law, both defendants who first print defamatory remarks 
and those who reprint defamatory remarks are equally liable for 
defamation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
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protection beyond what has been authorized by the United Supreme 
Court, and the media enjoy sufficient protection under existing 
constitutional law.^ Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225.
In Dickey, CBS aired statements by a Congressman accusing 
Dickey of accepting payoffs. See id. at 1222, 1224. The Third 
Circuit ruled that adopting the privilege would be inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court's ruling in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. 727 (1968), which held that libel against a public figure is 
shown when a defendant has serious doubts about the truth of the 
publication. Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225. The Dickey court instead 
applied the "actual malice" standard, holding that this offered 
the media enough protection. Id. at 1227.
Adopting the neutral reportage privilege is unnecessary 
because the United States Supreme Court has not adopted it, and 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), offers media 
sufficient protection. Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875, 
880-81 (S.D. 1985); see also McCall v. Courier-Journal and 
Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886-87 (Ky. 1981), cert, 
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) (declining to adopt the privilege 
also because other jurisdictions have criticized it). In 
Janklow, the Supreme Court of South Dakota refused to apply the
^ others have argued that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the First 
Amendment in Edwards, because the Supreme Court places no 
constitutional value on protecting defamatory statements. See Dennis 
J. Dobbels, Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A 
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should be Rejected,
33 Hastings L.J. 1203, 1224-25 (1982).
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neutral reportage privilege to a book about a former state 
attorney general, holding that the media are adequately shielded 
under New York Times when they print defamatory facts and 
opinion. Janklow, 378 N.W.2d at 876, 881.
This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege 
created by the Second Circuit, because the Supreme Court has not 
approved it and because it has been criticized in other 
jurisdictions as being an unnecessary extension of defamation 
law. See McCall, 623 S.W.2d at 886-87. The United States 
Supreme Court's "actual malice" test offers The Globe generous 
protection in defamation suits. See Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1227.
B. The neutral reportage privilege does not place enough
value on an individual's reputation and right to
privacy.
California courts place a high value on an individual's 
right to privacy. See Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 
746 (1989). The state constitution protects an individual's 
interest in protecting his or her reputation. Id. Protecting a 
person's reputation is more important than adopting a new media 
privilege which would expand the media's right to free speech.
See id.
The California Constitution declares that "[a]11 people are 
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are . . . pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy."
Cal. Const, art. I, § 1. The state constitution also protects 
the right to free speech, stating, "[e]very person may freely
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speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of this right." Cal. Const, art. 
I, § 2(a) (emphasis added); cf. U.S. Const, amend. I (stating 
that Congress shall not abridge freedom of speech).
The California Supreme Court has recognized the state 
constitutional right to privacy when balancing it with the 
importance of protecting the media in defamation lawsuits. See 
Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746. In Brown, a television station accused 
the plaintiff of making serious mistakes in a home remodeling 
job. at 719-20. This Court noted that the state
constitution offers more protection to defamation victims than 
the federal constitution. Id. at 746. Creating a new media 
privilege would run against the California Constitution's 
protection of defamation plaintiffs. Id.
Here, adopting the neutral reportage privilege would violate 
Mr. Khawar's constitutional right to protect his reputation. See 
id. The Globe is responsible for abusing its right to free 
speech. See id.; see also Cal. Const, art. I, § 2(a). It is 
more important to shield Mr. Khawar from the detrimental effects 
of the accusation that he assassinated Senator Kennedy than it is 
to create a new media protection for The Globe. See Brown, 48 
Cal. 3d at 746.
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C. The neutral reportage privilege is incompatible with
California libel law.
The media enjoy no "public interest" privilege under 
California law to publish defamatory statements. Brown, 48 Cal. 
3d at 724. State laws that protect the media cannot be used to 
violate a citizen's important right to privacy. See Rancho La 
Costa, Inc, v. Superior Court (Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.), 106 Cal. 
App. 3d 646, 667 (1980), cert, denied sub nom.. Penthouse Int'l 
V. Rancho La Costa, Inc., 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
The California Civil Code defines a privileged publication 
as one made:
In a communication, without malice, to a person interested 
therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one 
who stands in such relation to the person interested as to 
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the 
communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the 
person interested to give the information.
Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997). This Court held that
section 47(c)^ does not create a broad public-interest privilege
for the news media. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725. The Court
rejected the defendants' claim that section 47(c) applies to all
communications which are of "public interest," Id. Section
47(3) was not meant to grant a sweeping privilege to the news
media. Id. at 727. The state legislature passed the statute
only to codify the narrow "common interest" privilege found at
common law. See id.
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In Rancho, Penthouse Magazine printed an article which 
accused resort owners of being connected to organized crime. 
Rancho, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 649. The magazine claimed that this 
article was privileged under section 47(c) because there was a 
general public interest in the resort. Id. at 664. The court 
held that the word "interested" in section 47(c) does not refer 
to readers' general interest in the subject of a newspaper 
article. at 664-65. Rather, "interested" refers to a more
"direct and immediate concern." Id. at 664. The court ruled 
that this narrow privilege does not apply to widely-read, 
national publications which publish defamatory remarks. Id. at 
668.
There, the court compared the importance of the right to 
privacy with the importance of the right of free speech. Id. at 
667. The court said the right of free speech does not allow the 
media to violate a citizen's right to privacy by printing 
defamatory statements. Id. This statutory interpretation is 
consistent with judicial interpretation of the state's 
constitutional right to privacy. See supra Part III.B.
Adopting the neutral reportage privilege in California would 
not be consistent with California libel law. See Brown, 46 Cal. 
3d. at 729. Although California Civil Code section 47(c) 
provides a narrow "common interest" privilege, this does not
® The California Supreme Court based its decision in Brown on 
California Civil Code section 47(3), which is now section 47(c). The 
wording of the current statute is the same.
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cover the broad "newsworthy" criteria of the neutral reportage
privilege. Rancho, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 664-65. The neutral
reportage privilege allows the media to reprint defamatory
charges in some circumstances, which would violate California's
valued right to privacy. See id. at 667.
If this Court adopts the neutral reportage privilege, 
future defamation victims will suffer under a heavy 
burden of proof in order to recover.
Expanding media protection "would effectively preclude 
recovery by a defamed private individual." See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d 
at 746. Creating the neutral reportage privilege was unnecessary 
in the first place; thus, it means defamation victims face 
another hurdle in court. See James E. Boasberg, With Malice 
Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral 
Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 466 (1991).
Adopting the neutral reportage privilege would mean that 
defamation victims would have to prove more than actual malice 
when trying to recover. See id. The Second Circuit pointed out 
that the plaintiff in Edwards did not prove actual malice by the 
Times or that the Times reporter doubted the truth of the Audubon 
Society's accusations. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120-21. Absent this 
showing, the plaintiff would have lost its defamation claim 
anyway, and adopting neutral reportage was not necessary to 
exonerate the Times. Boasberg, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent, L.J, at 
467.
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Adopting the neutral reportage privilege would allow fewer 
defamation victims to recover for a violation of their right to 
privacy, because courts could dismiss more claims on summary 
judgment. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 n.l6 
(N.D. Cal. 1984). In Barry, Sports Illustrated printed 
accusations that a college basketball coach had illegally 
funneled money to a star player. See id. at 1112. The district 
court applied the neutral reportage privilege when granting 
summary judgment to defendant, holding that the First Amendment 
protects neutral reporting of accusations. Id. at 1124, 1128.
The Barry court pointed out that the privilege applies 
regardless of a defendant's subjective state of mind, unlike the 
"actual malice" standard, which requires an inquiry into a 
defendant's knowledge about his or her story. Id. at 1124 n.l6. 
The court called this a "practical advantage for defendants," 
because a standard that does not probe a defendant's state of 
mind is more appropriate for summary judgment. Id. This would 
rob plaintiffs from having a chance to have their claims heard in 
court, id.
The First Amendment affords the media a high level of 
protection, which means it is difficult for plaintiffs to recover 
when the media harm their reputations. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746. 
This Court rejected as speculative defendants' arguments that 
holding the media to a higher standard of care would have a 
"chilling effect" on reporting the news. See id. The media are
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already protected by the actual malice standard when they print 
defamatory remarks. See Brown, 48 Cal, 3d at 746.
IV. EVEN IF CALIFORNIA COURTS ADOPTED THE "NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE," IT WOULD NOT EXONERATE THE GLOBE BECAUSE THE
ARTICLE DOES NOT SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF THE PRIVILEGE.
A, Mr. Khawar is not a public figure.
The neutral reportage privilege applies to reports about 
public figures. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 
F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). 
Mr. Khawar is a private figure. See supra Part. I, Therefore, 
the neutral reportage privilege would not apply to stories about 
him. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
B. The Globe article was not a neutral and accurate 
report, because it was not balanced and did not include
a response from Mr. Khawar.
The neutral reportage privilege does not extend to one-sided 
stories which do not include a response from a person accused of 
a crime. Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 (2nd 
Cir. 1980). The privilege covers stories which include reactions 
from those accused of wrongdoing. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. 
Publications which distort accusations or appear to agree with 
them lose the protection of the privilege. Id.
The Edwards court noted that the reporter had made a good 
faith effort to get both sides of the story, stating that this 
balance was part of the "fair and dispassionate reporting" that 
allowed the article to qualify for the neutral reportage 
privilege. Id. at 118, 120.
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Being fair also means being neutral and not espousing the 
views of an accuser. See Edwards/ 556 F.2d at 120. Publishers 
who deliberately distort statements lose the protection of
neutral reportage. Id.
In Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 
1984), the court suggested that it would not have applied the 
privilege if the article in question did not include both sides 
of the controversy surrounding possibly illegal recruiting 
practices, as other articles covered by the privilege had done. 
The article also included information about the credibility of 
those malcing the accusations against the coach, which allowed the 
public to act as "the . . . arbiter of the truth of [the] 
accusations made."
Cianci, the same court that decided Edwards considered a 
case where a magazine printed a story about a Rhode Island mayor 
who had faced accusations of rape more than a decade before 
taking office. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 56. The magazine knew the 
mayor's side of the story, but the article did not include his 
claim of innocence or his version of what had happened. Id. at 
69. The Second Circuit rejected applying the neutral reportage 
privilege, in part because the article was not balanced. Id, 
Journalists should use special caution when reporting criminal 
allegations. See id. at 63-64.
Here, The Globe did not include a reaction from Mr. Khawar. 
(C.T. 3145) Unlike the journalists in Cianci, The Globe failed
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to check public records which would have proven Mr. Khawar's 
innocence. The Globe should have printed a reaction from Mr. 
Khawar in order to qualify for the neutral reportage privilege. 
See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. This is especially true in this 
case, because The Globe was accusing Mr. Khawar of a crime. See 
Cianci, 639 F.2d at 63-64. The Globe should have included 
accurate information about Morrow's credibility so readers could 
weigh whether they should believe the accusations against Mr, 
Khawar. See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1127. The Globe lost any 
claim to the neutral reportage privilege when it deliberately 
distorted the picture of Mr. Khawar by using an arrow to point 
him out and lightening the picture, (R.T. 2744.), to make Mr. 
Khawar more identifiable. S^ Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The 
trial judge determined as a matter of law that because of those 
distortions. The Globe's article was not a neutral and accurate 
report. (R.T. 2744.)
C. The Globe article was not based on information from a
reliable source.
Even when an article is one-sided, it should be based on 
"substantially true" information from a reliable source in order 
to be considered for constitutional protection. See Weingarten
V. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 150 (1980), cert, denied, 449 
U.S, 899 (1980). The neutral reportage privilege protects 
accusations which come from "responsible and well-noted" sources. 
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 122. In order for the privilege to apply.
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the defamer must be prominent. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126.
The court which created the neutral reportage privilege has 
also placed limits on it in order to prevent giving the media 
"absolute immunity" to present the most unjustified accusations 
it wants. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69-70. The media should not be 
able to launch unwarranted attacks on citizens based on "episodes 
long in the past and made by persons known to be of scant 
reliability." Id^ at 70. Granting new privileges to the media 
could lead to protection of almost every story the media wanted
to print. See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725.
In Meinqarten, the court held that a reporter who wrote 
about a former Seaside city attorney did not have to get his side 
of the story or verify information for the story. Weingarten,
102 Cal. App. 3d at 147-48. In fact, the court stated that the 
First Amendment does not protect only those stories which are 
undeniably true. I^ at 151. However, the court held that the 
reporter had no reason to believe that the story was false, and 
every statement in the article was based on information from an
"identifiable source." Id. at 150.
The Weingarten court cited the Edwards opinion but did not 
adopt the neutral reportage privilege. S^ i^ at 148. The 
opinion espoused the general goal of informing the public; it did 
not specifically mention the neutral reportage privilege. I^
In Edwards, allegations that some scientists are "paid to 
lie" about DDT came from the Audubon Society. Edwards, 556 F.2d
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at 117. A "highly respected" bird watcher first made the 
accusations in a forward to an issue of the Audubon Society's 
publication, American Birds, which included a statistical report 
of bird sightings, Edwards, 556 F,2d at 116. The court referred 
to the Audubon Society as "a responsible and well-noted 
organization," Id. at 122.
Allowing The Globe to print such outlandish accusations 
about Mr, Khawar without having to verify them would be granting 
the newspaper absolute immunity to launch an unjustified attack 
against Mr. Khawar. See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 725. Morrow's book 
was merely a new theory; it was not based on substantially true 
allegations. (R.T. 956.) Because The Globe's article was not 
based on charges from a reliable source, it does not deserve the 
protection of the neutral reportage privilege. See Edwards, 556 
F.2d at 122.
D. The Globe article was not newsworthy.
The Second Circuit created the neutral reportage privilege 
in order to protect newsworthy comments that might otherwise be 
suppressed. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120, 122. The privilege 
applies to accusations made about a figure who is embroiled in a 
controversy before the publication of the article. Barry, 584,
F. Supp. at 1126. A publication cannot create the controversy it 
prints. See id.; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill, 
135 (1979).
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The Edwards opinion emphasized that there was a controversy 
raging around the use of DDT that touched on "fundamental 
questions of value." Edwards, 556 F.2d at 115-16. One reason 
the court decided to grant the Times the neutral reportage 
privilege was because of the importance of fully informing the 
public about the controversial issue. Id. at 120.
The Barry court said the neutral reportage privilege applied 
when charges were made by "one participant in an existing public 
controversy against another participant in that controversy." 
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126 (emphasis added). The university 
where Barry worked had already begun an investigation into the 
coach's alleged wrongdoing when Sports Illustrated printed its 
article. I^ at 1112. The article did not create the 
controversy. See id.
Here, The Globe created the controversy. There was no 
debate raging around the assassination of Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 
2153.) Sirhan Sirhan had been convicted of the murder more than 
20 years before The Globe article was printed, and no credible 
sources had accused Mr. Khawar of the crime. (C.T. 3145, R.T. 
956.) Although there are many "conspiracy theories" surrounding 
the assassinations of Senator Kennedy and his brother, Mr. Khawar 
was not a "participant" in any "existing public controversy" when 
The Globe published its defamatory article. S^ Barry, 584 F. 
Supp. at 1126. No formal criminal investigation had been 
launched into Mr. Khawar's activities the night of Kennedy's
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assassination. Because The Globe article was not newsworthy and
Mr. Khawar was not a part of a controversy when the article was 
published, the neutral reportage privilege does not apply.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Khawar is a private figure because he took no 
affirmative actions to influence the outcome of a public 
controversy. There is clear and convincing proof that The Globe 
acted with actual malice in publishing the article. This Court 
should reject the neutral reportage privilege because the 
defamation standard presented by the United States Supreme Court 
provides adequate protection to the media. Even if this Court 
chooses to adopt the neutral reportage privilege, the new 
standard would not exonerate The Globe, because the article about 
Mr. Khawar did not meet the minimum requirements of the 
privilege. Accordingly, this Court should affirm each of the 
lower court's findings.
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